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Safety Considerations for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems with
Distributed Users
Brittany A. Duncan and Robin R. Murphy
Abstract— This paper identifies three categories of safety
risks posed by allowing multiple users to engage with
small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) and offers five
recommendations on how to reduce or mitigate these vul-
nerabilities. Data from sUAS can benefit multiple experts
at a disaster who may not be familiar with robots or co-
located with the pilot. Two different styles of interfaces
have been developed and tested with responders conducting
exercises to facilitate team coordination with a quadrotor
at Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service’s Disaster
City R© over a four year period. The two interfaces
illustrate three distinct categories of safety concerns: unsafe
control regimes, loss of situation awareness, and increased
stress. Five recommendations are proposed to mitigate
or eliminate the safety concerns: separate the payload
camera from the platform, giving the pilot a dedicated
“pilot-cam” and the experts a fully gimbaled payload; use
artificial intelligence to resolve conflicts between competing
directives from multiple experts; allow the pilot, or a
software agent, to turn off the expert’s ability to control
or communication; use multi-modal warnings rather than
rely on visual cues; and add guarded motion to prevent
collisions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUASs) are in-
creasingly being used in response operations with 14
deployments reported in [1] through 2013. As noted
by Murphy in the 2011 SSRR Outrageous Visions in
Computing Paper Competition [2], a challenge for sUAS
is that the real-time data from even a single sUAS will
be of use to multiple, distributed users and each user will
have their own competing priorities and mission needs.
The ability for a tactical responder, a task force leader,
an incident commander, or even an structural or medical
expert to work through the internet with the sUAS is
exciting.
In order to support distributed users, we have engaged
in research on multi-modal user interfaces that sup-
port team coordination through shared visual common
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ground. Peschel et al. [3] notes that based on human-
computer interaction principles, each user, which will
be referred to as a Mission Specialist to distinguish the
user from the Pilot as a user, will need a display tailored
to for their needs. Working with expert responders from
the Texas Engineering Extension Service, our center has
designed a series of user interfaces over a four year
period, and refined them by flying in over a dozen
exercises at the Texas A&M Engineering Extension
Service’s (TEEX) Disaster City R© complex using an
AirRobot 100B quadrotor. Two of the tablet interfaces
were extremely popular with responders. One interface
allowed a Mission Specialist to directly control the cam-
era payload, reducing the degree of team coordination
with the Pilot. The other interface allowed Mission
Specialists and the Pilot to communicate through sketch,
multi-touch, and audio links.
However, we have found that both user interfaces
introduce subtle safety issues, depending on the platform
and the users. Fortunately, these safety risks can be suffi-
ciently mitigated or eliminated through platform changes
and increased intelligent software. This paper reviews
related work in sUAS distributed team coordination and
multi-modal user interface design, then describes the two
most popular user interfaces from our research. Next, the
safety risks created by the two interfaces are identified,
followed by recommendations on how to overcome the
potential problems.
II. RELATED WORK
Peschel and Murphy [4] provides a survey of inter-
faces for users interacting with the UAS who are not the
Pilot. The likelihood of multiple users beyond the oper-
ator engaged with a small UAV has been acknowledged
by Gledhill et al [5] for wilderness search and rescue
and by Cavett et al in general [6]. Pond et al [7] report
on how visual and verbal communication interferes in
UAS for the US Air Force, while Pratt et al. [8] discuss
the construction of verbal communication protocols to
ensure safety.
While sketch, multitouch, speech-based, and other
multi-modal interfaces for small UAVs have been con-
sidered in the literature, these works do not consider
the impact of these communication modalities on overall
system safety. Cummings et al [9] describe the use of
sketch for planning UAS missions but did not discuss
any possible negative consequences or how multiple
users would use sketch. Guo et al [10] allowed users
to cooperatively plan missions using multi-touch on a
table surface interface, while Jourde el al [11] focuses
on a design notation for multi-touch control for gen-
erating plans; neither consider vehicle safety. Speech-
based interfaces to allow a mission specialist to work
with small UAVs have either considered speech for
mission scenarios where manual or visual interaction is
not possible [12], speech in terms of improving speech
understanding, not enabling audio communication [13],
or speech acts as the framework for reasoning and
problem-solving [14]. The two interfaces used in this
paper to illustrate potential safety issues allow manual
and visual interaction, as well as speech.
III. EXERCISES
The user interfaces were developed over a four year
period starting in 2011, with funding as joint project be-
tween researchers and professional responders at Texas
A&M University starting in 2012. Development relied
on monthly informal flights with feedback from respon-
ders from TEEX, five formal exercises with responders
from participating agencies such as the Texas Com-
mission on Environmental Quality, a set of controlled
human-robot interaction experiments, plus one deploy-
ment to the 2014 SR530 Washington State Mudslides
USA. The exercises and experiments were at the Disaster
City R© complex (Fig. 1) with the exception of a 2013
training event with South Carolina Task Force 1 at the
South Carolina Fire Training Academy. Disaster City R©
is one of the training facilities used by TEEX to train fire
rescue teams. Flight missions were primarily hazardous
materials (hazmat) spills using the chemical train de-
railment prop, though an exercise in 2014 focused on
the use of unmanned aerial systems for flooding and the
creek/pond at Disaster City R©.
The chemical train derailment prop replicates a train
carrying a variety of chemical tank cars. The train
has derailed due to hitting a tractor-trailer carrying
chemicals at a road crossing. The prop is challenging for
responders because it is surrounded by trees blocking the
view with binoculars; the trees also present challenges
for UAS flights. The derailment is next to a gas pipeline
that may or may not be ruptured due to the derailment
and there is a nearby a oil tank that may be leaking. The
responders must identify the types of chemicals being
transported by the vehicles, either through reading the































graphical directives to Pilot via sketch 
and multi-touch spotlighting
✔
direct control of camera capture (no 
indirect control of robot)
✔
direct control of pan, tilt, zoom of the 
camera (with indirect control of robot)
✔
verbal communication between team 
members via audio link
✔
TABLE I
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTERFACES IN TERMS OF CAPABILITIES.
multi-colored placards on the cars or by inferring from
the type of car. They must read the serial numbers on
the car to confirm contents and identify leaks and if
possible where the leaks are coming from and what is
the best mitigation strategy. The responders should also
identify any other relevant factors such as a waterway
that might be polluted by the spill or a school that
should be evacuated. Since the chemicals may be toxic
or explosive, the responders would ideally do this from
a distance without having to suit up in cumbersome
personal protection gear.
IV. SAMPLE MISSION SPECIALIST INTERFACES
When discussing the interfaces presented in this paper,
a specific lexicon will be used and is based on the
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phrasing developed by Peschel et al. in [3]. Dedicated
means an interface was specific to a role, e.g., a Pilot or
Mission Specialist role. Interfaces can be active, allow-
ing the user to directly interact with Pilot or the robot, or
passive. The Dedicated Active Mission Specialist inter-
face allows the Mission Specialist to actively control the
camera but does not provide a mechanism for interacting
with the Pilot other than verbal directives. The Shared
Active interfaces are a set of interfaces that allow the
Mission Specialist and Pilot to communicate with each
other by sketching and spotlighting on the shared display
of the robot’s camera video. The capabilities of each
interface are summarized in Table I and described in
more detail below.
A. DEDICATED ACTIVE MISSION SPECIALIST IN-
TERFACE
The Dedicated Active Mission Specialist Interface
was created by Peschel [3]. The goal was to provide
the Mission Specialist with a display tailored explicitly
to that role, rather than simply mirroring the Pilot’s
display, while allowing the Mission Specialist and Pilot
to maintain a visual common ground [15]. As can be
seen in Fig. 2, the display consists of two windows.
The larger primary window is the view from the payload
camera; it is the same view as the Pilot’s but it is stripped
of any artifacts such as robot state, remaining battery
life, etc., which was not considered important by the
responders. The smaller window is a GIS view of the
general area of the site and the dot and arrow shows
where the sUAS is currently located and the direction
it is facing. The interface allows the Mission Specialist
to use multi-touch commands on the primary window
to actively control the pan (swipe left or right to yaw
the aircraft), tilt (swipe up or down), and zoom (pinch)
of the camera and take high resolution pictures (button).
Because the Mission Specialist can control the tilt and
zoom, icons provide feedback. The interface also allows
the Mission Specialist to capture the low resolution
image on the primary window.
This interface has benefits for both the Mission Spe-
cialist and Pilot. For the Pilot, transferring control to
the Mission Specialist helped achieve a “sterile cock-
pit”where the Pilot was not distracted by the Mission
Specialist’s verbal directives or even the occasional hand
on their display. When the Mission Specialist spoke
to the Pilot, they shared the same frame of reference
avoiding problems with “whose left” seen in [16]. The
Mission Specialists were more comfortable and empow-
ered with this display over a mirrored display [17].
While the interface was preferred over a mirrored dis-
play by the Mission Specialists, it did present problems
Fig. 2. Dedicated Mission Specialist Interface.
for the Pilot. These problems were due to the fact that
the camera pan is accomplished by a UAS yaw, and
because the Mission Specialist could pan, tilt, and zoom
the camera during critical maneuvers such as take-off
and landing and navigating in cluttered regions. Not
only did these capabilities change the Pilot’s view, but
had the pan capability resulted in a yaw, depending on
conditions, that yaw could result in a translation that led
to a collision with a tree or structure at low altitudes.
During experimentation with inspecting a chemical train
derailment [17], the problem of unexpected camera and
robot movement– even when instructed not to move the
camera until the sUAS was on station– was significant
enough that the software was modified to disable Mis-
sion Specialist control until enabled by the Pilot after
the sUAS was on-station. The Pilot for the experiments
also found the tendency for some Mission Specialists to
alternate between direct verbal commands and control
distracting and confusing. The flight team as a whole
was concerned that the direct active interface risked the
possibility of the Pilot losing situation awareness of the
state of the robot in the environment.
B. SHARED ACTIVE INTERFACES
The Shared Active Mission Specialist Interface and
corresponding Shared Active Pilot Interface were cre-
ated by Henkel and Suarez [18] with two goals. The
first goal was to extend the Dedicated Active Mission
Specialist Interface to enable the Mission Specialist to
communicate with the Pilot via sketch and spotlighting
over the shared visual common ground. The communica-
tion was two-way, so the Pilot’s interface was also mod-
ified. The second goal was to enable multiple Mission
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Specialists working from distributed locations to interact
with the Pilot by creating a web-based interface viewable
by a browser over the internet. The interface eliminated
direct control of any function of the camera in order to
prevent the problems with loss of situation awareness
and control discussed in the previous subsection.
As shown in Fig. IV-B, the Shared Active Mission
Specialist interface intentionally looks similar to the
Dedicated Active Mission Specialist Interface. The sec-
ondary window with the contextual map is now larger
as the icons for the camera tilt and zoom controls are
no longer needed and the dot and arrow is replaced with
with a larger dot and viewing angle indicator. The most
significant change is that the primary window supports
the user sketching and spotlighting. Fig. 3 shows the
Pilot’s complementary Shared Active Interface. The Pi-
lot’s interface sees the sketching and spotlighting from
the Mission Specialist(s) and the Pilot can also sketch
and spotlight. The Pilot can clear all screens of sketches
thus clearing the Pilot’s display. The Mission Specialist
can only clear their sketches, thus communicating with
the Pilot independently of any other users. The Mission
Specialist presses a button to indicate when they want
a high resolution photo taken and both the Mission
Specialist and Pilot hears a recorded voice “photograph
requested” as confirmation of the request. The window
going black indicates the photo is being taken so no
additional acknowledgment is needed. The Shared Ac-
tive interfaces also were intended to have audio to allow
team members to talk and sketch or spotlight at the
same time to reinforce and clarify directives, though the
links did not consistently work and were not tested with
responders.
The benefits of the Shared Active interfaces are that
they supported naturalistic team communication, were
much faster to learn, and reduced the stress on the
Pilot from uncontrolled movements of the platform or
camera. The elimination of the direct control of the
camera reduced the impact on the Pilot and reduced
the responsibility of the Mission Specialist for being
familiar with the robot. The addition of sketching and
spotlighting was intuitive and responders who had used
the Dedicated Active Mission Specialist Interface pre-
ferred the Shared Active even though they lost control.
The sketch feature, where the user draws on the window,
is typically used by Mission Specialists to circle and
draw an arrow to indicate an object of interest and a
desired angle of approach. The Mission Specialists will
often write “done” when finished with the mission. The
Pilot frequently uses the sketch feature to write notes to




Fig. 3. Shared Active interfaces: a) Mission Specialist and b) Pilot
Interface.
is on-station and “too much” when Mission Specialists
individually or collectively begin to make too many
demands. The spotlighting feature, where a user presses
on the window until a moveable bright spot appears,
has been used spontaneously by Mission Specialists for
two functions. One common function is to hold the light
at the edge of the image to indicate that the object of
interest is offscreen and the camera or robot should move
in that direction. The other function is to highlight an
object that might be moving, or appear to be moving due
to the image shaking, that they would like to approach
or zoom in on; a sketch is static on the window and thus
the object may move faster than the Mission Specialist
can redraw.
While the Pilots and Mission Specialists preferred the
Shared Active interfaces to the Dedicated Active Mis-
sion Specialist interface or mirror displays, problems did
emerge. While team coordination between the Pilot and
a single Mission Specialist was enhanced, team coor-
dination with multiple Mission Specialists tend towards
chaos. Multiple Mission Specialists often sketched and
spotlighted independently, even for scenarios where they
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were designated as strictly observers, creating a highly
cluttered Pilot’s view that often resulted in the Pilot turn-
ing off all sketching and spotlighting. The spotlighting
function works by darkening the screen except for the
dot; while no flight problems were observed, darkening
the screen does degrade the Pilot’s view.
V. SAFETY CONCERNS
The two interfaces illustrate three distinct categories
of safety concerns stemming from allowing distributed
users to actively interact with the sUAS and Pilot: unsafe
control regimes, loss of Pilot situation awareness, and
increased Pilot stress.
A. Unsafe Control Regimes
The Dedicated Active Mission Specialist Interface
combined with a sUAS platform without an independent
gimbal for the camera posed two unsafe control regimes.
As witnessed in the exercises, allowing the Mission
Specialist to yaw the robot in order to pan the camera
put the sUAS at risk of translating due to GPS error
or a sudden gust of wind and thus at risk of hitting a
tree or structure. Having two mission specialists trying
to control the vehicle or a single camera would lead to
directive “collisions” and if each were sending conflict-
ing vehicle commands, unpredictable vehicle behavior
could emerge.
B. Loss of Pilot Situation Awareness
The Dedicated Active Mission Specialist Interface
increased the Mission Specialist’s usability of the sUAS
at the cost of the Pilot’s situation awareness. The source
of loss of situation awareness, following Endsley’s def-
initions in [19], was due to the the Pilot’s inability to
control the viewpoint. When the Mission Specialist takes
control of the camera, the Pilot has no means by which
to perceive the movement of the platform relative to
threats in the environment, e.g., loss of Level 1 SA
(Perception). It can be difficult to tell if the robot is
drifting or changing altitude from an arbitrary viewing
angle. Without being able to actively look around and
update the understanding of the environment, the Pilot
also loses the ability to generate Level 2 SA (Compre-
hension) and Level 3 SA (Projection) needed to project
possible problems, emergency landing strategies, etc.
Under the Dedicated Active Mission Specialist Inter-
face, the Pilot can take back control of the camera if
an anomalous condition occurs, but a smooth transfer
of control from the Mission Specialist to the Pilot is not
guaranteed. The series of exercises at Disaster City R©as
well as structural inspection flights in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina found that when the Pilot had to take
back control to move the vehicle or return to home, it
was easy to become disoriented because of the tendency
of the Mission Specialists to leave the camera zoomed
in and at an unnatural angle for flying.
C. Increased Pilot Stress
The Shared Active Interfaces avoid explicitly unsafe
control regimes and eliminate the loss of the Pilot’s
ability to maintain situation awareness but it increases
the Pilot’s stress due to increased cognitive load. Four
sources of increased cognitive load have been observed
with the Shared Active Interfaces during exercises; these
are presented in order of severity of impact:
Graphical and audio communication from multi-
ple Mission Specialists. Multiple Mission Specialists
avoided extensive or contradictory sketching, probably
because they could easily see how the imagery was being
obscured. However, there appeared to be no natural
disincentive to use spotlighting, which leads to overdark-
ening of the screen. The most significant instance of the
multi-user directive collisions occurred when three users
were all using spotlight to direct the pilot to different
places. As can be seen in Fig. 4, the pilot simply wrote
“too much” and then began ignoring all input from
the Mission Specialists. The audio link implementation
for multiple users did not work consistently, but we
speculate that this will be a source of communication
conflict from multiple Mission Specialists.
Increased workload due to performing some Mission
Specialist functions. The Pilot was flying, yet had to take
photos.
Graphical communication mechanisms degrading vi-
sual display. Spotlighting was a popular choice by
Mission Specialists but it requires darkening the screen
slightly. No instances of Pilot error (or frustration) were
observed when a single Mission Specialist used the
spotlight during exercises.
Distracting audio communication. Irrelevant or fre-
quent audio communication has the potential for dis-
tracting and increasing the cognitive load of the Pilot;
however, responders are trained in radio communications
and their verbal commands were effective in amplifying
the graphical indicators. Instead, the quality of the audio
link was observed to be a distraction, with poor quality
producing visible signs of frustration by the Pilot.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The experiences with the two different interfaces sug-
gest that ultimately it is desirable to allow the Mission
Specialists to be able to perform their role rather than in-
creasing the Pilot’s cognitive workload by absorbing the
camera operations and deconflicting multiple requests.
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!!Fig. 4. Shared Active Mission Specialist Interface displaying multi-spotlight points and a pilot sketch reflecting “too much” information.
Ideally a combination of the two Active interfaces would
be created. The improved interface would be Shared
enabling team coordination; Mission Specialists to use
sketch, spotlight, and audio to communicate deconflicted
platform directives to the Pilot, providing team members
with a highly naturalistic mechanism for teamwork. The
Pilot’s improved Shared Active Interface would support
the maintenance of situation awareness. The Mission
Specialist’s improved Shared Active Interface would
be similar to the Dedicated Active interface, allowing
the Mission Specialist to direct control the payload but
eliminating entering unsafe control regimes.
We offer five recommendations on how reach the
desired interaction and interface for distributed users
while promoting safety:
Separate the payload camera from the platform, giv-
ing the Pilot a dedicated “pilot-cam” and the Mission
Specialist a fully gimbaled payload to control that does
not require yawing the robot. This would enable the
Mission Specialist to directly perform camera operations
without turning the robot platform. The “pilot-cam”
would allow the Pilot to actively maintain situation
awareness at all times without having to be subordinate
to the Mission Specialist. This would introduce a differ-
ent style of team coordination as the Mission Specialist
(or artificial intelligence) would have to compensate for
the platform’s movements to keep the camera payload
on track.
A separate, fully gimbaled payload is not a new
idea: the iSENSYS IP3 sUAS used at Hurricane Katrina
and the Berkman Plaza collapse was equipped with
one [1]. The Pilot for those flights preferred this to
the “pan=yaw” configuration and it did not impact the
Mission Specialist. Separating the cameras from the
platform controls has appeared in commercial sUAS tar-
geted for videography, but these manufacturers typically
assumes the Pilot will look at the vehicle while flying,
aka heads-up or taking an exocentric viewpoint. Flying
heads-up limits the effective distance for using the robot
for disaster situations because it makes it extremely hard
to judge position relative to structures.
Use artificial intelligence for conflict resolution be-
tween competing directives from multiple Mission Spe-
cialists. Conflict resolution algorithms for planning and
resource scheduling are common in artificial intelligence
and could be applied to reduce Pilot cognitive load
from having to resolve competing requests and reduce
distraction from listening to or seeing the requests.
Algorithms would rely on the rules such as “share
time equally between Mission Specialists” or to give
priority based on the chain-of-command. Alternatively,
scheduling algorithms could attempt to aggregate the di-
rectives, for example minimizing the number of vehicle
movements or determining the direction of interest to
the most participants.
Allow the Pilot or a software agent, to turn off
Mission Specialist control or communication. A partial
alternative to redesign of sUAS to have a completely
independent payload is to bar the Mission Specialist
from exercising control at the wrong times. One solution
is a button on the Pilot’s interface, which requires the
Pilot to take action. In some cases, the Pilot may not
be able to disable Mission Specialist control and deal
with the current unexpected situation created by the
Mission Specialist. A more attractive solution is to create
intelligent software to infer when control by a Mission
Specialist is inappropriate, such as take off and landing,
returning home, or when the battery level is too low to
continue a flight.
Use multi-modal warnings in Pilot interfaces rather
than relying on visual cues. The preference for the Ac-
tive Shared Interfaces highlights the potential to overuse
the visual channel of communication. The Pilot’s inter-
face is already subject to darkening and clutter from
sketches. However, the audio channel is available and
warnings can override any verbal conversation from
Mission Specialists.
Add guarded motion to prevent collisions. While
allowing the Pilot (or robot) to selectively bar Mission
Specialist control helps with overcoming the safety
risks from the “pan=yaw” style of payload, it is not a
complete solution. Even though the Mission Specialist is
legitimately working, they can introduce unsafe move-
ments. Despite GPS and IMU advances, there is still
a tendency for platforms to drift off station, especially
when yawing. As noted in [20], artificial intelligence
could be used to to build at least a coarse understanding
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of the environment and react to obstacles such as trees
and buildings.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our experience indicates that remotely-viewable in-
terfaces for distributed users (Mission Specialists) are
desirable for safety, security, and rescue sUAVs. These
interfaces allow one or more experts who are unfamiliar
with the sUAS focus on the mission and allows them
to work over the internet, coordinating with the Pilot.
However, our experiences also indicate that Active inter-
faces that allow the Mission Specialist to actively control
the robot or engage the Pilot pose safety risks. These
risks can be mitigated with both hardware and software
changes. The hardware can reduce risk by moving away
from sUAS where the payload camera is the pilot cam or
the payload camera requires the platform to yaw in order
to effect a camera pan. Artificial intelligence can reduce
risk in three ways: it can manage conflict resolution if
multiple Mission Specialists give the Pilot competing
directives, provide multi-modal warnings to the Pilot
rather than use visual channels which are being used
for situation awareness and team coordination, and for
providing guarded motion.
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